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KEY OUTCOMES
ecbi
During a very instructive session on “negotiating tips and tricks” for new negotiators, at an ecbi training workshop before the Katowice Climate Conference, an experienced climate negotiator offered advice on ways to find 
compromises and common “landing zones” between the positions of countries, to 
reach consensus under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
A participant asked, very pertinently, whether compromises between countries will be 
enough to address climate change.  
The responses to this question from experts at the workshop pointed to the various 
benefits of multilateralism, from the lack of alternatives to solve global problems; 
to giving equal voice to all countries; and to greater efficiency than bilateralism. At a 
time of mounting global challenges, multilateralism is under increasing threat, and its 
defence is necessary. Global agreement on anything in this current chapter of human 
history is a triumph. Expectations were especially low in the run-up to Katowice, given 
the lack of trust between key country groups. Many feared that Katowice would end 
without a result, like the climate conferences in Copenhagen in 2009, and The Hague in 
2000. 
While these fears were not realised, and the Conference ended with a celebratory leap 
by the President, the question asked by the rookie negotiator deserves to be revisited in 
the aftermath: did the compromises that had to be made to accommodate the varied interests 
of 197 countries in Katowice add up to an adequate response to climate change?
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The 24th Conference of Parties (COP24) to the UNFCCC was an important milestone 
for the international climate change regime, expected to further animate the Paris 
Agreement by adopting the detailed rules for its implementation. It was rendered even 
more critical by a clear message from the world’s scientists just two months before: the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report on Global Warming 
of 1.5oC stated clearly that the emissions reductions offered by countries under the Paris 
Agreement so far will not limit global warming to 1.5°C, even if they are supplemented 
by very challenging increases in the scale and ambition of emissions reductions after 
2030. Countries will need to increase their ambition significantly before 2030 to limit 
temperature rise to 1.5°C.
Global average temperature has already risen by over 1°C above pre-industrial levels. 
2018 saw extreme weather events, including wildfires, droughts, heat waves and floods 
in the Northern Hemisphere causing heavy casualties and huge economic losses. The 
means to enable effective adaptation, and to address climate-related loss and damage 
are therefore critical elements of success for any global climate negotiation.
The Katowice Conference was expected to be the COP that signalled a switch from 
generally negotiating the climate change regime, to implementing climate action with 
the seriousness and commitment called for by the IPCC special report. The success 
of Katowice, beyond achieving multilateral agreement, can therefore be measured by 
the extent to which it catalyses ambition within a narrow window of opportunity, and 
delivers the means to make this ambition possible. 
This summary of outcomes considers key Katowice outcomes, in search of answers. 
In particular, it considers the three main elements of COP24 that aimed to deliver 
early ambition (in order of the COP decision): the Paris Agreement rulebook; pre-2020 
ambition; and the Talanoa Dialogue.
Despite repeated calls, the 
IPCC special report on 1.5°C 
was not on any of the 
agendas at COP24. The 
Caribbean Community 
and SIDS had to insert 
references under various 
existing agenda items.
Carlos Fuller, 
Caribbean Community
Calling out science sceptics
The first week of the Katowice Conference ended on a low note, as four countries – the 
US, Saudi Arabia, Russia and Kuwait – opposed “welcoming” the IPCC’s special report on 
Global Warming of 1.5°C.
This was more than simple breach of 
etiquette. By questioning the contents of 
the report, these countries sought to dilute 
the urgency and momentum that the report 
was creating, and kill any support in the 
negotiations to firmly move the spotlight 
firmly on the hitherto aspirational 1.5°C 
limit of the Paris Agreement, from the less 
ambitious 2°C goal.
In the end, the Conference welcomed the 
“timely completion” of the report. This 
incident, derided by commentators, is an 
indication of the odds against which the Paris Agreement Rulebook was agreed.
“You are not mature enough to tell it like it is,” 15-year old Greta Thunberg, a young 
activitst from Sweden,  told conference participants in a scathing address. “Even that 
burden you leave to us children.”
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PARIS AGREEMENT RULEBOOK
The Paris Agreement, adopted in 2015, provides a general framework for the 
international climate change regime. To reach agreement, however, important elements 
were left deliberately vague and deferred to a later date. Many of these issues have been 
subsequently addressed under the Paris Agreement Work Programme (PAWP). The 
Katowice Conference was tasked with finalising the PAWP by adopting detailed rules on 
the implementation of the Paris Agreement (the so-called “Paris rulebook”).
To a large extent, the conference formally delivered on this, as substantive decisions 
were adopted in all areas of the Paris Agreement – with the exception of the market and 
non-market mechanisms under Article 6. However, in many areas, decisions on sub-
items were deferred – including, for instance, the development of common reporting 
tables for Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and national inventory reports 
(to November 2020); the rules of procedure of the Article 15 Committee (November 
2020); and further guidance on features of NDCs (the end of 2024).
This section summarises some of the key elements of the agreed rulebook, in particular 
as they relate to overall ambition.
1. NDCs and mitigation
The Paris Agreement focuses on Parties’ reporting requirements around the reduction 
and mitigation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. As part of the PAWP, Parties had 
to develop further guidance on the features of their NDCs, the additional information 
to be provided by Parties to facilitate clarity, transparency, and understanding of their 
NDCs; accounting; the operation of the registry that records the NDCs and several other 
issues.
Scope and content of NDCs
The Paris outcome called for further guidance on features of the NDCs to be developed, 
for consideration and adoption by the first Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA1). This proved contentious, as 
many Parties felt that the issue of NDC features has already been adequately addressed 
in the Paris Agreement, and did not warrant a further discussion. There was also little 
agreement on what common features NDCs should have, and whether and when to 
continue consideration of further guidance (reflecting, once again, the deeper dispute 
between “top down” and “bottom up” approaches). Unsurprisingly, no consensus could 
be found, and the topic was deferred to 2024, while acknowledging that the features of 
NDCs are already outlined in the Paris Agreement.
Questions related to the content of NDCs related to the information NDCs should 
contain, and how this information should be presented. Should they contain 
information only on mitigation, or also on other elements such as adaptation and 
finance? Parties’ positions differed considerably, and it was eventually agreed that 
the information necessary for clarity, transparency, and understanding (ICTU) in an 
NDC is “without prejudice to the inclusion of components other than mitigation”. Parties 
can thus provide other information – in particular, adaptation communications can be 
submitted as a component of, or in conjunction with, NDCs, using guidance related to 
the adaptation communications (see adaptation section). 
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A critical qualifier for ICTU in the  rulebook is that Parties “shall” provide this 
information “as applicable” to their NDC. Thus, while the guidance applies to all Parties 
(without differentiation, as some Parties had wanted), they have the flexibility to 
determine which ICTU is applicable to their NDC. The use of “shall” clarifies that the 
application of the guidance on ICTU is binding on Parties. 
Within this caveat, it was agreed that elements of ICTU in the second and subsequent 
NDCs should include quantifiable information on, for example: the starting point 
for mitigation contributions; timelines for their implementation; further scientific 
assumptions; whether a multi- or single-year target is applied; and methodological 
approaches. While these ICTU rules will apply from the second NDC, Parties are 
“strongly encouraged” to provide this information in relation to their first NDC, including 
when communicating or updating it by 2020. This means that comparability between 
NDCs will be increased from 2030 onwards – and possibly before, if several Parties use 
the new ICTU rules for updating or communicating their NDCs in 2020.
The Paris Agreement (Article 4.10) calls for the consideration of common timeframes 
for NDCs. This is not simply a procedural issue but key to unlocking ambition, and 
promoting fairness. However, in the lead-up to the Katowice Conference there were 
significant disagreements on: whether the common timeframes should be five years, ten 
years, five or ten years (based on the choice of the Party), or five years plus an indicative 
NDC for a second five-year period (“5+5”); whether timeframes should be nationally 
driven; and whether flexibility would be granted for developing countries.
While some progress was made in whittling down the text on common timeframes 
in Katowice, Parties failed to agree on a specific solution. Instead, they requested the 
Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) to continue the consideration of this matter 
in June 2019 to make a recommendation to the CMA. The text does not stipulate 
that this has to be the next session of the CMA in 2019, but Parties decided that the 
common timeframes shall apply from 2031.
Emissions accounting and reporting of mitigation policies
A further task for the rulebook was to provide guidance for accounting for NDCs. As in 
the discussions on features and ICTUs, there were diverging views on whether common 
guidance should apply to all countries, or whether there should be separate guidance 
for developed and developing countries. In the end, Parties agreed on a common set 
of guidance – binding on all Parties – and decided against the strict formal distinction 
between developed and developing Parties that had been applied under the Kyoto 
Protocol. This guidance will also apply from the second and subsequent NDCs, though 
countries may elect to apply it for their first NDCs (as agreed in Paris).
It was agreed that Parties will account for their NDCs in biennial transparency reports 
(BTRs). They shall account for anthropogenic emissions and removals in accordance with 
methodologies and common metrics assessed by the IPCC and adopted by the CMA. 
These are to be updated by the CMA once the IPCC provides new methodologies. Parties 
whose NDC cannot be accounted for using IPCC methodologies will have to provide 
information on the methodology used. Moreover, the same global warming potentials 
are to be applied by all Parties for conversions between different GHGs.
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Parties should strive to include all categories of anthropogenic emissions or removals 
in their NDCs, and provide an explanation if any category has been excluded. Once a 
source, sink or activity is included, it should continue to be included in future NDCs. 
Also, all mitigation policies are to be reported. 
A review, and if necessary update, of the guidance for ICTU and accounting will be 
initiated in 2027, with a view to adopting a decision in 2028. This means that such an 
update will only inform new NDCs in 2030. 
Public registry
The modalities and procedures for the operation and use of the public NDC registry, 
called for in Article 4.12 of the Paris Agreement, were hotly debated in the run-up to 
COP24. The main issues of contention were whether there should be one registry or two, 
and whether there should be an advanced search function. In the end, it was agreed that 
the interim public registry prepared by the secretariat will serve as the public registry, 
following any necessary revisions, subject to confirmation by CMA2 in November 
2019. It will consist of a registry portal with two parts, one for NDCs and another for 
adaptation communications. 
The secretariat is requested to develop a prototype and present it to Parties in June 
2019, to enable CMA2 to take a decision. An annex lays out the modalities and 
procedures for the operation and use of the public registry. The registry will contain all 
previously submitted NDCs, but while it will allow sorting and searching for specific 
NDCs, no advanced function will be available for searching within and across NDCs.
Response measures
The issue of negative impacts of “response measures” (economic or social losses 
triggered by the implementation of mitigation policies in other countries) has 
traditionally been a side-stream of mitigation-related negotiations. At COP24, the CMA 
confirmed the Paris decision that the Forum on the Impact of the Implementation of 
Response Measures under the Subsidiary Bodies (SBs) will serve the Paris Agreement.
The modalities, development of a six-year work programme, and functions of the 
Forum were agreed. A key task for the Forum is to develop modelling tools and 
methodologies to assess the impacts of mitigation policies. A Katowice Committee of 
Experts on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures was established, 
with 14 members, to support the work of the Forum. Two members will come from 
intergovernmental organisations (a new feature of a UNFCCC body). The first meeting 
of the Committee will be held for two days, in conjunction with the SB sessions starting 
from their fiftieth sessions (June 2019). Parties are invited to submit nominations for 
the committee and suggestions for the workplan by 15 April 2019.
2. Cooperative approaches 
The most visible gap in the Paris rulebook was caused by the failure to agree on the rules 
for the Article 6 mechanisms of the Paris Agreement: cooperative approaches under 
Article 6.2; the mechanism for mitigation and sustainable development under Article 
6.4; and the non-market mechanism under Article 6.8.
We worked extremely hard 
to secure comprehensive 
and robust accounting rules, 
and a mechanism that 
works for host countries 
in the new context, under 
Article 6.  However given 
the positions of some other 
Parties, and the potential 
loopholes involved,  a 
resolution proved impossible. 
In the end we were forced 
to conclude no rules would 
be better than bad rules, 
at least under Article 6. 
Hopefully we can work to 
resolve the outstanding 
problems this year.
 Martin Hession, 
European Commission
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Substantial progress was made during an unprecedented number of negotiation hours, 
and the following areas of agreement existed before the text was “buried”: 
● On governance, there was agreement that the Article 6.2 mechanism would not to be 
subject to international oversight, while the Article 6.4 mechanism would be run by 
a supervisory body similar to the current Executive Board of the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM).
● Parties participating in Article 6.2 would need a registry, but the UNFCCC would 
provide a joint registry for those countries unable/ unwilling to set up their own 
registry.
● Article 6.4 would include a grievance mechanism.
● Accounting would be subject to a technical expert review along the lines of the 
review agreed under Article 13. Accounting would be done against inventories, not 
NDCs.
● Non-CO2 units could be used, requiring a buffer registry.
● Corresponding adjustments could be limited to the end of the NDC period.
● Overall mitigation of global emissions would be purely voluntary, and no discount of 
units would be done.
● Each Party would have to describe in its BTR why reference levels and baselines 
would be stringent and below business as usual.
● Upscaling of mechanisms beyond projects and programmes would be possible.
However, some critical stumbling blocks remained. Differences between certain 
emerging economies (especially Brazil) on one side, and least developed countries 
(LDCs), the Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC), 
Environmental Integrity Group (EIG), and most industrialised countries on the other 
side regarding the need for robust accounting and the role of activities and credits from 
the Kyoto Mechanisms under the Paris Agreement could not be overcome. 
The straw that broke the camel’s back was the exemption of non-NDC sectors from 
corresponding adjustments sought by Brazil. Further remaining differences included:
● the scope of the mechanisms, particularly the coverage of sectors outside the 
NDCs (including deforestation), and the use of units for mechanisms outside of 
the UNFCCC regime (such as the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for 
International Aviation, CORSIA);
● the adaptation charge on Article 6.2 (opposed by industrialised countries); and
● whether baselines should be defined by best available technologies or by benchmarks 
and the duration of crediting periods.
It should also be noted that paragraph 77(d) of the Katowice decision on the 
modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework specifies that a 
corresponding adjustment is necessary for both: the use of units for the achievement of 
NDCs; and for international mitigation purposes other than the achievement of NDCs 
(such as for CORSIA compliance).
In the end, the Article 6 decision was deferred to CMA2 in November 2019, with the 
negotiations to be resumed from a relatively early version of text (issued on 8 December 
2018). Texts issued by the Presidency in the second week were seen by many Parties as 
not fully reflecting consensus, and the texts issued on the last day of negotiations (L.24, 
L.25 and L.26) were opposed so strongly by many Parties that they were deleted from 
the UNFCCC website.
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3.  Adaptation
A key concern for developing countries has been to ensure that adaptation is given as 
much importance as mitigation (along with means of implementation) in the climate 
negotiations. Hence, for instance, the push for adaptation communications and the 
inclusion of adaptation elements in the NDCs. However, while the rulebook contains 
a fair amount of text on the adaptation components the Paris Agreement, it lacks the 
granularity and specificity of the rules for mitigation. The focus is still very much on 
“take it or leave it” guidance on reporting; seeking metrics to measure adaptation action; 
timidly considering ways to facilitate support; and “urging” support from developed 
countries for LDCs and other developing countries.
Adaptation Communications
Article 7.10 of the Paris Agreement provides that Parties can voluntarily submit 
and update adaptation communications, that may describe national priorities, 
needs, actions and efforts. COP24 elaborated further guidance for these adaptation 
communications, “…including, inter alia, as a component of nationally determined 
contributions”. It was agreed that the purpose of the adaptation communication is to: 
● increase the visibility and profile of adaptation and its balance with mitigation;
● strengthen adaptation action and support for developing countries;
● provide input to the global stocktake; and
● enhance learning and understanding of adaptation needs and actions. 
The flexibility provided to Parties in the Paris Agreement is maintained, including in 
the choice of communication or document in which a Party may submit its adaptation 
communication. While the decision itself calls for ex ante information, Parties may 
additionally choose to include ex post information, such as information on progress, 
results achieved, and monitoring and evaluation.  
Parties that choose to submit their adaptation communication as part of National 
Communications or National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) may take into consideration 
the guidelines that exist for these documents. In addition, the Adaptation Committee, 
with the engagement of the IPCC, is tasked with drafting supplementary guidance for 
voluntary use by Parties by June 2022. This will be considered at the 57th meeting of 
the Subsidiary Bodies in November 2022, and if necessary, revised in 2025, following a 
stocktake.
The decision further contains provisions inviting relevant bodies/institutions to support 
developing countries in the preparation and submission of adaptation communications, 
and in the implementation of their adaptation plans and actions.
Public Registry
The adaptation communications will be stored in the public registry mentioned before, 
which will have two parts, for NDCs and adaptation communications respectively.
Assessing adaptation needs
It was agreed that the Adaptation Committee, in collaboration with the LDC Expert 
Group (LEG) and others, will develop and regularly update an inventory of relevant 
methodologies to assess adaptation needs related to action, finance, capacity-
building, and technological support by June 2020. Following submissions by Parties 
If we keep kicking the 
can down the road, we 
not only risk losing the 
can, we risk losing our 
way. In decades to come 
we will all be historically 
responsible. Who do we 
blame then and who will 
take responsibility? If the 
ship is sinking we can’t say 
that we are OK because 
our cabin has no water.
Kishan Kumarsingh,
Trinidad and Tobago
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and observer organisations by February 2020, the Adaptation Committee, with the 
IPCC, will prepare a technical paper on methodologies to assess adaptation needs 
and their application, related gaps, good practices, lessons learned and guidelines, for 
consideration and further guidance by the 57th session of the Subsidiary Body for 
Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA57) in November 2022. The Paris Committee 
on Capacity Building (PCCB) is also invited to facilitate access to, and implementation 
of, methodologies for assessing adaptation needs in the context of providing support for 
building adaptation capacity.
Recognition of adaptation efforts
While some developing countries have pushed for greater recognition of their efforts 
to deal with the impacts of climate change for several years, a concrete way of doing so 
has proven elusive. At COP24, it was agreed that the synthesis report prepared by the 
secretariat for the global stocktake would include information on the adaptation efforts 
of developing countries (including an assessment of support needs for adaptation). The 
information will be drawn from “the most recent documents that may contain adaptation 
information”, which could include adaptation communications, NAPs, National 
Communications, NDCs, other reports prepared under the transparency framework, 
and reports of the IPCC and other relevant scientific bodies.
Coherence of institutional arrangements
At COP24, it was agreed that the Adaptation Committee and the LEG will serve 
the Paris Agreement. Institutional arrangements related to finance, technology 
development and transfer, and capacity-building, are encouraged to strive for a balance 
between adaptation and mitigation. The Consultative Group of Experts and the LEG 
are invited to work together on training for assessing vulnerability and other aspects of 
adaptation. The Adaptation Committee is invited to continue making recommendations 
on ways to enhance collaboration, and promote coherence and synergies of adaptation-
related institutions. 
4. Loss and Damage
While there was no specific outcome on loss and damage at Katowice, important 
advances were made on this issue: references to loss and damage have been included 
in the transparency mechanism and global stocktake. The rules for the transparency 
framework state that interested Parties may provide, as appropriate, information related 
to enhancing understanding, action and support, on a cooperative and facilitative basis, 
to avert, minimise and address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts. 
The global stocktake may take into account, as appropriate, efforts to avert, minimise 
and address climate-related loss and damage. 
These two additions came as a result of heavy lifting by small island developing States 
(SIDS) and LDCs, who argued that the inclusion of Article 8 (on loss and damage) in 
the Paris Agreement meant that the issue should be considered in the context of overall 
implementation of the Agreement, including in its review mechanisms. 
5.  Finance
There were at least four main areas of contention related to finance in the rulebook 
negotiations:
● Ex ante information to be provided by developed countries under Article 9.5 of the 
Paris Agreement.
● Ex post information to be provided by developed countries under Article 9.7 of the 
A major outcome of Katowice 
was the inclusion of reporting 
on, and consideration of, 
loss and damage in the 
transparency framework and 
in the global stocktake. 
 
Maesela Kekana, 
South Africa
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Paris Agreement.
● The role of the Adaptation Fund in serving the Paris Agreement, which needed 
elaboration, and sources of funding.
● The long-term financial goal for the post-2025 period.
Another contentious issue that arose during the negotiations was the elaboration 
of Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement, which calls on Parties to make finance 
flows consistent with a pathway towards low GHG emissions and climate-resilient 
development.
Article 9.5
In Katowice, Parties reiterated that the biennial communication under Article. 9.5, 
which is mandatory for industrialised countries and voluntary for all other countries 
from 2020 onwards, will include, “as available”, projected levels of public resources and 
methodologies and assumptions for projections, and information on programmes, 
funding channels, the type of support, proposed evaluation criteria of climate finance 
providers, lessons learnt, plans to mobilise further funding etc. as well as “an indication 
of new and additional resources to be provided, and how Parties determine such resources as 
new and additional”. This flexibility to report on new and additional resources has been 
seen as a signal to developed countries that climate finance is not required to come from 
new funding streams alone, and criticised by some commentators.
The secretariat is requested to establish a dedicated online portal for the biennial 
communications; prepare a compilation and synthesis of the information from 2021 
to feed into the global stocktake; and organise biennial in-session workshops. These 
guidelines will be reviewed at CMA6 in 2023. 
Article 9.7
The outcome of the discussions under Article 9.7 on the modalities for the (ex-post) 
accounting of financial resources provided and mobilised through public interventions 
was incorporated into the decision on the rules for the transparency framework in the 
wider context of information on financial, technical, and capacity building support. 
Developed country Parties will have to provide information on, inter alia, the amount 
provided annually, the amount used to mobilise support, the type of intervention (e.g. 
grant, capacity building) and the relevant sector/s of the economy. (There are, however, 
still no common guidelines to calculate the climate finance value of loan financing). 
As part of the underlying assumptions, definitions, and methodologies Parties should 
also indicate their definition of public and private finance, identify a clear causal link 
(between public intervention and mobilised private finance), and include information 
on their efforts to avoid double counting. Acquisition of units under the market 
mechanisms cannot be counted as climate finance. Parties will also report on their 
experience regarding policies to incentivise private climate financing and investment.
Role of the Adaptation Fund
It was decided that the Adaptation Fund, set up under the Kyoto Protocol, shall serve 
the Paris Agreement from 1 January 2019. Further, it will exclusively serve the Paris 
Agreement once the share of proceeds under Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement become 
available. It will, however, continue to receive the share of proceeds, if available, from 
the CDM of the Kyoto Protocol.
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Developing and developed country Parties to the Paris Agreement will be eligible for 
membership to the Adaptation Fund Board (AFB) – this matter will be considered 
by SBI50 in June 2019, and a recommendation will be forwarded to the fifteenth 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
(CMP15) in November 2019.
The AFB is requested to consider the rules of procedure of the Board in this light. Their 
recommendations will be considered by CMP15, and then by CMA2 in November 2019.  
Long-term quantified goal
Although UNFCCC Article 11.3, in 1992, called for the “determination … of the amount of 
funding necessary and available for the implementation of this Convention”, there has been 
no progress on this Article in the past, mainly because developed countries were afraid 
of inflated demands from developing countries. For the same reason, resistance was 
in evidence, before Katowice, to initiating work on Article 9.3 of the Paris Agreement, 
which calls for the setting of a new collective long-term quantified goal for climate 
finance by 2025. 
The Paris Agreement, in Article 2.1(c), introduced another finance-related concept 
that proved highly controversial – in this case mainly for developing countries: that of 
“making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and 
climate-resilient development”. 
Remarkably, both taboos are addressed in the Katowice decision relating to the new 
collective quantified goal on finance. It calls for deliberations on the new quantified goal 
to begin at CMA3 November 2020; and for consideration, as part of these deliberations, 
of the aim of making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low GHG 
emissions and climate-resilient development. 
The goal of making finance flows consistent is also mentioned in the annex of the 
decision related to Article 9.5, which calls for the biennial communications to report 
on how support provided and mobilised is targeted at helping developing countries 
in making financial flows consistent with a pathway towards low GHG emissions and 
climate-resilient development. 
(This quid pro quo overcoming of taboos on both sides is also reflected in the 
guidance provided to the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF): it is requested to 
map information on Article 2.1(c); and to prepare a report on the determination 
of developing country needs related to implementing the UNFCCC and the Paris 
Agreement, every four years).      
6. Technology development and transfer
COP24 adopted the scope of, and modalities for, a transparent, inclusive and 
participatory periodic assessment of the effectiveness and adequacy of the support 
provided to the Technology Mechanism.
The first periodic assessment will begin at CMA4, in November 2021, and be completed 
in CMA5. The outcomes should serve as an input to the global stocktake, and guide 
improved effectiveness and enhanced support to the Technology Mechanism. They will 
also be considered when updating the technology framework. SBI51 in November 2019 
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is asked to “consider the alignment between processes” pertaining to the review of the 
Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN).
COP24 also adopted the Technology Framework established under Article 10.4 of the 
Paris Agreement, to be implemented by the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and 
the CTCN, under CMA guidance. The TEC and CTCN will report progress in their joint 
annual reports. The Framework will, inter alia:
● provide overarching guidance to the work of the Technology Mechanism; and
● play a strategic role in improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the work of the 
Technology Mechanism (which consists of the TEC and CTCN). 
Towards this end, the TEC and CTCN are required to incorporate the guidance contained 
in the technology framework into their respective work plan and programmes of work. 
It was agreed that the Framework can also facilitate the strengthening of financial 
support for technology development and transfer. The key themes of the Framework 
include implementation; enabling environment and capacity building; collaboration; and 
stakeholder engagement and support. 
7. Capacity building 
The PAWP did not include further work on capacity building, as the PCCB was 
established at COP21. However, language on capacity building was added to the decision 
providing guidance on Article 4 on mitigation, and was key to unlocking agreement 
on guidance to ICTU and accounting. Capacity building was also a key concern for 
developing countries in the transparency discussions, and this is reflected in the 
guidance decision.
8. Transparency 
The transparency arrangements for action and support, through which countries report 
back on their efforts to address climate change, are a “top-down” element of the Paris 
Agreement that allows an assessment of otherwise “nationally determined” action. The 
key area of disagreement in the transparency discussions related to whether reporting 
rules for countries should be uniform but with some flexibility for those developing 
countries that need it on the basis of their capacities; bifurcated as in the Kyoto Protocol 
regime; or include a more nuanced differentiation between developed and developing 
countries.
In Katowice, Parties opted for a common set of rules with flexibility for those 
Parties that need it. The modalities, procedures and guidelines (MPGs) state that the 
application of flexibility for those developing countries that need it in the light of 
their capacities will be self-determined. Developing countries should, however, clearly 
indicate the provision to which flexibility is applied, clarify capacity constraints, 
and provide estimated timeframes for improvements in relation to those capacity 
constraints. The application of flexibility provisions by developing countries cannot be 
reviewed by the technical expert review teams. The US and a few of the Umbrella Group 
countries had hoped to put a time limit on this flexibility, but did not succeed. LDCs and 
SIDS can apply the transparency rules “at their discretion”.
Flexibility, where it is needed, will not apply across the board: the MPGs specify the 
provisions for which flexibility is available. This includes, for example, the scope, 
frequency and level of detail of reporting; and the format of the technical expert review 
(whether it is in-country, or centralised). Provisions are also made to facilitate improved 
Despite the external 
challenging environment, 
Katowice delivered 
guidelines that promote 
trust among countries 
through the enhanced 
transparency framework 
and can facilitate further 
ambition. All stakeholders 
must ensure that this 
outcome steers us to 
greater climate action and 
benefit the most vulnerable.
 Irene Suárez Pérez, 
AILAC
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reporting and transparency over time, including the identification of capacity building 
support needs, and the provision of support. Developing countries using flexibility are 
encouraged to report on how they will improve over time.
Parties are expected to submit their first BTR and national inventory report (NIR) (if 
submitted as a stand-alone report) at the latest by 31 December 2024. This means that 
the 2023 Global Stocktake will be based on existing (and less comprehensive) reporting 
requirements. The Global Environment Facility (GEF) is to provide financing for BTRs of 
developing countries, and for building their transparency-related capacity.
BTRs are expected to cover a number of elements. Some of these, such as the submission 
of GHG inventory reports, information on progress towards implementation and 
achievement of NDCs, use of market mechanisms, and support provided by developed 
countries, are mandatory, whilst others (information on adaptation and support 
received) are not. In addition, countries may submit information related to enhancing 
understanding, action and support, on a cooperative and facilitative basis, to avert, 
minimise and address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts.
Countries will have to report using common reporting tables and tabular formats to be 
developed by SBSTA, and adopted by CMA3 in 2020, taking into account the existing 
common tabular formats and common reporting formats. The application of flexibility 
for those developing countries that need it in the light of their capacities relates to key 
aspects of the BTRs/NIRs, as indicated in the Table below. 
Flexibilities in BTRs/NIRs
All Parties Developing countries using flexibility
Key category threshold 95% 85%
Significance threshold 0.5 Mt CO2/0.05% national 
emissions
1Mt /0.1%
Gases covered 7 gases CO2, CH4, and N2O
Time series 1990 – 2 years bp* 2020 – 3 years bp*
Emission projections 15 years beyond next round year Voluntary, until end of NDC period
Climate finance provided Mandatory Voluntary
Uncertainty assessment Quantitative and qualitative 
estimates
Qualitative estimate for key categories
* before present year
Transparency arrangements under the Paris Agreement rulebook
Agreement on  
date of  TER week 
with the Party
Developing country: 
TER team prepares 
final version of TER 
report
0 104 14 16 17 23 27 32 38 42 WEEKSSTART
TER week:  
TER team does review, 
requests additional 
information and flags draft 
areas of improvement
TER team  
prepares draft  
TER report, which  
is sent to Party
Comment  
deadline 
(developing 
country)
By 
Secretariat, 
immediately 
after  
submission  
of BTR
Setup of 
technical 
expert review 
(TER) team
Preliminary 
questions to 
the Party  
by TER team
Party should make 
reasonable effort to 
provide requested 
information
Comment 
deadline 
(developed 
country)
Developed country: 
TER team prepares 
final version of TER 
report
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The MPGs also cover the process of reviewing information submitted by Parties, which 
includes two aspects: a technical expert review (of mandatory information submitted 
in the BTR and NIR) that will take one year; followed by a facilitative, multilateral 
consideration of progress (FMCP) towards implementation and achievement of a 
country’s NDC and its efforts under Article 9. The technical expert review may take 
different forms: centralised; in-country; desk-based; or simplified.
Countries and intergovernmental organisations are invited to nominate experts for 
the roster of experts. The secretariat will produce synthesis reports of BTRs, technical 
expert review reports, and records of FMCP. These will be published on the UNFCCC 
website. The GEF is tasked with assisting developing countries in meeting their 
increased reporting requirements. There is also a role for the Consultative Group of 
Experts, who will now also serve the Paris Agreement, to assist by facilitating the 
provision of technical advice and support to developing countries.
9. Global Stocktake 
Areas of disagreement on the global stocktake (GST) during the Katowice Conference 
related to the  operationalisation of equity; the scope of the GST; whether loss and 
damage should be in a separate workstream under the technical dialogue, or if it should 
be addressed under the adaptation workstream; the modalities of the GST; and the 
participation of stakeholders. 
Although agreement was reached on these issues at the very end, some were 
disappointed at what they saw as a weak outcome. “As it is now, the stocktake is not 
set up to measure individual and collective contributions under the Paris Agreement,” 
commented one negotiator. “That means the GST can derail into a meaningless 
‘exchange of experiences’.” 
Modalities
The GST will consider three thematic areas: mitigation; adaptation; and means of 
implementation and support. However, the technical dialogue between Parties may 
consider loss and damage and response measures within these thematic areas; and 
inputs may include information on loss and damage. 
The stocktake will have three stages:
● Information collection and preparation: This will begin one session before 
the start of the second component (the technical assessment), and end six months 
before the final consideration of outputs. During this stage, the secretariat will 
organise a webinar to clarify methodologies and assumptions used to aggregate 
inputs, and prepare synthesis reports on: the state of GHG emissions and mitigation 
efforts undertaken by Parties; the state of adaptation efforts, experience and 
priorities; the overall effect of NDCs; and financial flows. The SBSTA and SBI Chairs 
will then identify information gaps and request additional input.
● Technical assessment: This stage, which can overlap with the first, will take 
stock of implementation; assess collective progress; and identify opportunities 
for enhanced action and support. For the first GST, this component will take place 
during the two (or depending on the timing of the publication of the IPCC reports, 
three) successive SB sessions preceding CMA6 in November 2023. The discussions 
should be balanced, holistic and comprehensive; consider linkages; and take into 
account equity considerations and the best available science. A technical dialogue 
between Parties, through in-session round tables, workshops or other activities, will 
The COP24 outcome 
highlights the extent to 
which the international 
politics of climate change is 
wildly out of sync with global 
technological capacity to 
actually address the problem. 
It also exposes the willful 
ignorance of the multilateral 
process in relation to the 
scientific consensus on the 
scale of the climate problem 
and the limited timeframe 
left for meaningful action. 
Consequently, even though 
the COP24 outcome 
delivered the key elements 
to make the Paris Agreement 
operational, it did not secure 
the ambition required to 
make it worthwhile.
 Rueanna Haynes, 
St Kitts and Nevis
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be organised thematically, on mitigation, adaptation, and means of implementation 
and support (and in this context, efforts to address the social and economic 
consequences and impacts of response measures; and to avert, minimise and address 
climate-related loss and damage). The dialogue co-facilitators will  summarise 
outputs for each thematic area, taking into account equity and the best available 
science.
● Consideration of outputs: This stage will consist of high-level events to present 
the technical assessment findings and discuss implications, with a view to informing 
Parties in updating and enhancing their actions and support in the light of equity 
and the best available science. For the first GST, this will take place at CMA6 in 2023. 
During this stage, challenges and opportunities will be identified; and key political 
messages will be summarised and be referenced in a decision for consideration by 
the CMA, and/or a political declaration. 
This cycle will repeat every five years, following reviews based on experience gained 
in the first and subsequent GSTs. The SBSTA and SBI Chairs are requested to develop 
guiding questions for the GST, including specific thematic and crosscutting questions. 
The GSTs will be Party-driven, with the participation of non-Party stakeholders. The 
latter may make submissions, but cannot participate in the consideration of outputs. All 
inputs will be fully accessible by Parties, including online.
Inputs
The GST will consider information at a collective level on: 
● GHG emissions and mitigation efforts undertaken by Parties;
● the overall effect of NDCs and overall progress made by Parties towards 
implementing NDCs;
● the state of adaptation efforts, support, experience and priorities;
● finance flows (including information from the latest SCF biennial assessment);
● efforts to enhance understanding, action and support, on a cooperative and 
facilitative basis, related to averting, minimising and addressing climate-related loss 
and damage;
● barriers and challenges, including finance, technology, and capacity-building gaps 
faced by developing countries;
● good practices, experience and potential opportunities to enhance international 
cooperation on mitigation and adaptation; and  
● fairness considerations, including equity, as communicated by Parties in their NDCs.
Global Stocktake under the Paris Agreement rulebook
INPUTS
● IPCC reports
● Party reports, communications, 
submissions, inputs for equity
● Inputs from UNFCCC, UN, int’nl 
bodies, non-Party stakeholders etc.
Technical Assessment
  Technical dialogue,   
  SBSTA-IPCC  
dialogue
Consideration 
of Outputs
High level  
events
Information Collection,  
Preparation
Webinar, synthesis reports, 
identification of gaps
THEMATIC AREAS
Mitigation,  Adaptation, Means of Implementation
(Loss and damage and response measures may be considered within these thematic areas)
OUTPUTS
● “Non-policy prescriptive” 
consideration of collective 
progress
● No individual Party focus
● CMA decision and/or declaration
TIMELINE FOR THE FIRST GST Begins at CMA5/ 2022 TA ends mid-2023 CMA6 in 2023
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The sources for this information will include: reports and communications from 
Parties; IPCC reports; reports from the SBs, and other bodies under or serving the Paris 
Agreement and UNFCCC; synthesis reports by the secretariat; reports from UN agencies 
and other international organisations; voluntary submissions from Parties, including 
on inputs to inform equity considerations; relevant reports from regional groups and 
institutions; and submissions from non-Party stakeholders and UNFCCC observer 
organisations.
Outputs
The outputs of the stocktake should summarise opportunities and challenges for 
enhancing action and support in the light of equity and the best available science, as 
well as lessons learned and good practices. The overall outputs of the GST should focus 
on taking stock of the implementation of the Paris Agreement to assess collective 
progress, with no individual Party focus. It should include “non-policy prescriptive 
consideration of collective progress” that Parties can use to update NDCs and enhance 
international cooperation for climate action.
The outputs should “be referenced in a decision for consideration and adoption by the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement and/or 
a declaration”. (As in the case of the Talanoa Dialogue, this ambiguity on whether there 
should be a COP decision could  dilute the overall impact of the stocktake process). 
Parties are then requested to present their NDCs, informed by the GST outcome, at a 
special event under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General. A “political moment” 
under the UNFCCC where all Parties are expected to adjust their NDC ambition in 
response to the GST is not currently envisaged. 
In the final plenary, India expressed disappointment with the treatment of equity in the 
stocktake, particularly in the outputs of the GST. Some other negotiators felt progress 
was made on this issue, as the equity metrics used by Parties in their NDCs will be used 
as a source of input and form part of both the technical and political phase. However, 
there is no clear guidance on how equity will be considered in either the inputs, 
technical assessment, or outputs. Others expressed disappointment that the equity 
discussion continued to be framed in the burden-sharing context, rather than in the 
context of “leaving no one behind” as the world moves to a new, low-emission paradigm 
of development. 
10. Compliance
The basic make-up, size, and – at least partially – mandate of the Compliance Committee 
for the Paris Agreement’s compliance mechanism (Article 15) was already decided in 
Paris. The modalities and procedures for its operation adopted in Katowice, therefore, 
repeat the existing arrangements previously agreed and create the process for the 
election of its members (at the CMA in 2019, 6 members will be elected for 2 years, and 
6 members for 3 years). The modalities and procedures will be reviewed at CMA7, in 
2024.
The Committee will make every effort to reach agreement on any decision by consensus. 
If this fails, the decision may be adopted by at least three quarters of the members 
present and voting. The rules mandate the Committee to develop further procedural 
rules on its operation (conflict of interest, timelines etc.) for adoption by the CMA in 
2020.
We got a robust Rulebook. 
Now let’s focus on 
ambition.
Outi Honkatukia, 
Finland
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Parties generally accepted that a “self-referral” should trigger the committee’s 
involvement. A written submission by a Party with respect to its own Paris Agreement 
implementation and/or compliance will, therefore result in an examination by the 
Committee.
In addition, the Committee itself can initiate the consideration of issues if Parties 
did not comply with their basic reporting obligations under the Paris Agreement (e.g. 
submit an NDC, NIR, BTR, information on support provided and information under 
Article 9.5) or failed to participate in the FMCP. The Committee is, however, barred from 
considering the content of the required information (paragraph 23 of the modalities and 
procedures). Its mandate is limited to the “if”, and does not cover the “how”.
To consider cases of “significant and persistent inconsistencies” in NIRs, progress reports, 
information on support provided and the modalities, procedures and guidelines on 
transparency in general, the consent of the Party concerned is required. The Committee 
can issue findings of fact and recommendations, and identify measures such as further 
dialogue, assistance in the engagement with other bodies or the development of 
an action plan. It can also bring systemic issues faced by a number of Parties to the 
attention of the CMA – but in this context, it shall not single out any individual Party. 
It cannot engage in enforcement or dispute settlement, nor can it levy penalties or 
sanctions. 
PRE-2020 AMBITION
A recent ecbi policy brief pointed to the importance of pre-2020 climate action, 
particularly in light of the IPCC special report on Global Warming of 1.5°C, and in light of 
developing country concerns that inadequate action by developed countries in the pre-
2020 period would shift an additional, and unjust, burden on developing countries in 
the post-2020 period. The policy brief highlighted two key elements of pre-2020 action: 
mitigation action; and finance, to enable mitigation action in developing countries. 
At COP24, a stocktake on pre-2020 action was held in two parts: a technical meeting on 
5 December 2018, and a high-level meeting on 10 December 2018. In the absence of a 
mandate to measure precise quantitative (aggregate or individual) progress (the chances 
for which could perhaps be enhanced if the Doha Amendment receives sufficient 
ratifications and comes into force), the stocktake process was more in the nature of a 
“show and tell”. 
The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), in a statement, expressed alarm that despite 
the findings of the IPCC special report on 1.5°C, 2018 posted the highest emissions 
on record. “We are going in the wrong direction,” the AOSIS Chair cautioned, calling 
on developed countries to redouble their pre-2020 efforts and provide financial, 
technological and capacity-building support to developing countries so they too can 
ramp up pre-2020 action.
On climate finance, the 2018 Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows 
by the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) found that while overall climate finance 
flows increased by 17% in 2015-2016 compared to 2013-2014, it was largely driven by 
high levels of new private investment in renewable energy. Public sector climate-specific 
flows from developed to developing countries, as reported in biennial reports from 
countries, amounted to US$ 38 billion. Climate finance analysts also expressed concern 
While Katowice may not 
have delivered all we 
wanted, there must be 
no more excuses. COP24 
has given us guidance 
to implement the Paris 
Agreement. Countries 
must now respond to the 
findings of the IPCC Special 
Report on 1.5°C by coming 
forward with more ambitious 
nationally determined 
contributions by 2020 at 
the latest, building on the 
learnings from the Talanoa 
Dialogue.
 Kaveh Guilanpour, 
Republic of the Marshall Islands
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that the overall increase in climate finance was due to an increase in the provision of 
loans, rather than grants.
Another pre-2020 stocktake will take place at COP25 in 2019, but the window for 
ambition in the pre-2020 period is very near closing.
TALANOA DIALOGUE
In Paris in 2015, the aggregate ambition described in countries’ NDCs was insufficient 
to reach the long-term temperature limitation goal adopted in the Paris Agreement. 
It was therefore decided to convene a facilitative dialogue in 2018 to take stock of the 
collective efforts and to inform the preparation of NDCs. Under the Presidency of Fiji, 
the dialogue was renamed the Talanoa Dialogue. Parties and civil society stakeholders 
were invited to share ideas and experiences and engage in collective efforts to limit 
the rise in global average temperatures in line with the Paris Agreement. While only a 
limited number of Parties made submissions in response to this call, hundreds of civil 
society organisations made submissions. 
Many who came to the conference in Katowice expected further political signals on 
ambition, the need for urgent action in light of the special IPCC special report on 1.5°C, 
or even a continuation of the Talanoa Dialogue possibly leading into the first global 
stocktake under the Paris Agreement.
The Dialogue’s final political phase took place at COP24 with the participation of 
ministers, who met in roundtable discussions on 11 December 2018. At the closing 
meeting of the Talanoa Dialogue on the following day, the Presidencies of COP23 and 
COP24 (Fiji and Poland) were tasked to provide a summary of key messages from the 
roundtables.
In their statements to the COP plenary, representatives of the two countries listed an 
array of issues that were addressed during the discussions, ranging from the need for 
global cooperation, pursuit of the Sustainable Development Goals, and mainstreaming 
climate change into law and policy, to carbon pricing and labelling, forests, just 
transition as well as the adverse effects of climate change, adaptation, human hardship, 
and indigenous knowledge. However, they did not extract any specific key concerns, 
conclusions or appeals out of their summary that the COP could have subsequently 
endorsed, supported, welcomed or noted. Instead, the COP decision merely “takes note 
of the outcome, inputs and outputs” of the Dialogue and invites Parties to consider these 
in preparing their NDCs and enhancing pre-2020 ambition. “The outcome should have 
been a COP decision inviting Parties to update their NDCs by 2020 to meet the 1.5°C 
target, particularly in light of the IPCC Special Report” says Carlos Fuller, from the 
Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre. 
The ministerial roundtables of the Dialogue were a first for the UNFCCC process. It may 
be challenging to imagine a group of ministers and senior civil servants equipped with 
post-it notes in interactive discussions on how to raise mitigation ambition. However, 
any mediocre facilitator (with a little bit of experience in NGO strategy processes) would 
have been able to translate the leading themes into clear messages. Perhaps that was 
already deemed to be politically unachievable? 
2019 will be critical to carry 
forward the momentum 
from the Talanoa Dialogue 
and the IPCC 1.5°C Special 
Report. The UN Secretary-
General’s climate summit 
in September 2019 will be 
an important platform for 
governments to commit to 
bolder, stronger, fairer and 
faster action and support, 
that will take us towards 
1.5°C pathways.
Manjeet Dhakal, 
Nepal
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The Dialogue appeared to have more impact in the informal sphere. For instance, the 
“high-ambition coalition” of almost 50 countries issued a press statement during 
COP24, expressing their determination to step up ambition by 2020, informed by the 
Talanoa Dialogue. The ultimate success of the Dialogue in raising ambition under the 
UNFCCC can only be judged in 2020, depending on how many countries raise their 
ambition, and by how much. Meanwhile, there is time for civil society to hold their 
governments accountable, to implementing the decision they signed on to in 2015 (to 
use the Dialogue to inform their updates or communication of NDCs); and to heeding 
the Talanoa Call for Action.  
OTHER DECISIONS
A few of the other significant COP decisions that were adopted in Katowice, and 
discussions that took place, are highlighted here. 
In the discussions on the Green Climate Fund (GCF) replenishment, a related 
disagreement centred on asking the SCF to prepare an assessment of funds needed 
by developing countries to implement the Convention, with a view to help inform the 
first GCF replenishment process. A reference to the IPCC special report on 1.5°C in the 
GCF decision was opposed by some countries on grounds that it will lead to focus on 
mitigation (others felt it would increase the focus on adaptation). The decision calls for 
the replenishment process to conclude in October 2019. 
Calls for direct access to funds from the GEF were opposed, on grounds that this 
would “open the floodgates” for national institutions’ accreditation across different 
environmental conventions.
The Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform was further operationalised 
in Katowice. A Facilitative Working Group, that will consist of 14 members, including 
seven representatives from indigenous peoples’ organisations, was established. It will 
meet twice a year, and propose an initial two-year plan at COP25.
CONCLUSIONS
In Katowice, the international community reached a formal agreement on how to 
implement most of the elements of the Paris Agreement. This was due to the strong 
engagement by UN Secretary-General António Guterres, who came to Katowice three 
times to push for a successful outcome; the flexibility shown by some countries; and 
the Polish Presidency (particularly towards the end of the meeting). There are still some 
gaps – such as the market mechanisms and the common timeframes – but they will be 
gradually filled by the Parties and the designated bodies of the Paris Agreement. With a 
degree of flexibility, it seems, multilateralism can still succeed.
To come back to the question of the rookie negotiator: does the Katowice outcome solve 
the climate change problem? No, it does not. Current climate pledges – if implemented 
– will not limit global warming to 1.5°C or even 2°C. It remains to be seen if the Talanoa 
Dialogue will result in increasing the ambition of countries, although the prognosis does 
not look good, especially in the absence of a clear call, or a COP decision. If the Dialogue 
(and the pre-2020 stocktake) is a preview of the global stocktakes to come, then this 
The formation of the 
Facilitative Working Group of 
the Local Communities and 
Indigenous Peoples Platform 
was a significant outcome 
at COP24. For the first 
time in the history of the 
Convention, there is equal 
participation of non-Party 
and Party representatives 
in a body governed by the 
UNFCCC.  This is important, 
because in light of the IPCC 
1.5°C report every type 
of knowledge, including 
indigenous and traditional 
knowledge, that enables a 
rapid transition to a low-
carbon world is invaluable.
Annela Anger-Kraavi, 
Estonia
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does not bode well for the future of the regime either. Without a specific point of time 
when all countries are expected to rise up to the task at hand and do their fair share, 
countries are unlikely to feel any pressure to enhance their pledges. However, a “common 
pressure point” can still, perhaps, be created through the discussion on common 
timeframes.
The Paris rulebook is the result of many small compromises, which gives Parties not 
only flexibility in its implementation but also room for interpretations. As a tool to 
operationalise a legal instrument that has been described by some academics as “soft 
law” (especially given the absence of sanctions), it does not provide a robust framework 
that holds Parties’ accountable for their actions and inactions. Neither does it incentivise 
or even encourage Parties to “over-perform” and make the ultimate effort in limiting and 
reducing GHG emissions. It is not, therefore, an adequate response to the climate crisis, 
or to the clarion call of the IPCC’s 1.5°C report.
Brazil, following the election of its new president Jair Bolsonaro, withdrew its offer 
to host COP25 in 2019. COP25 will now take place in Santiago, Chile (tentatively 
from 11-22 November). Chile is a middle-income developing country Party that has 
traditionally tried to build bridges between the South and North through the AILAC 
group. The country will perhaps be better placed to make loss and damage a key issue 
of the meeting, following the review of the loss and damage mechanism; bring together 
countries on an equal footing; finalise the negotiations on Article 6; and ensure that the 
negotiators are guided by the urgency to act now.
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